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COMMENT

Sex, Violence, and Profanity: Rap Music
and the First Amendment
Lauded by some and condemned by others, rap music does not want
for a divergence of views on its nature, meaning, or message. The deluge
of profanity coupled with vivid images and themes of sex and violence
have provided fertile ground for discussion of rap's merits. Critics have
characterized rap as "ugly macho boasting," "bombastic, self-aggrandizing," and "repulsive." 1 Rap artist Ice Cube's Death Certificate album was
the subject of a rare editorial comment by Billboard magazine deriding
the lyrics as "the rankest sort of racism and hatemongering." Detractors
fear that the violently negative messages promote a value system that celebrates the decadence of the street.s Providing support for that view, a
federal district court in Florida declared the rap group 2 Live Crew's all. Jerry Adler, et. al., The Rap Attitude, NzwswEEK, Mar. 19, 1990, at 56. The article
also claims that rap has "taken sex out of teenage culture, substituting brutal fantasies of
penetration and destruction." Id. This view is an interesting contrast to the view expressed
by Judge Gonzalez in Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla.
1990). See infra note 4.
2. Alexander Tresniowski, People, TIME, Dec. 2, 1991, at 88. At the same time the album
was ranked number two on nationwide album charts. Id.
3. "Sure, the streets are tough, but we need to promote a different set of values," Robert
C. Bobb, then city manager of Richmond, Virginia. David Mills, Guns and Poses, WASH.
TIMEs, Aug. 17, 1989, at El. "You teach that your culture need aspire to nothing high,
because the low is the high; and that your culture ... need look no further than the street."
Too Cruel, Live, THE Nzw REPutLIc, July 9, 1990, at 8.
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bum As Nasty As They Wanna Be legally obscene.' In the summer of
1992, rap artist Ice-T found himself embroiled in controversy over his
song "Cop Killer" which New York governor Mario Cuomo called "[u]gly,
destructive and disgusting." Yet, rap has also been praised as reflective
of the "wit, energy and hope of a generation ... a positive development
in a miserable environment." Even though some rap artists paint vivid
pictures of "a harsh and violent world [,...
their popularity is based in
the basic realism of [the] street life they present. '7 It has even been suggested that these "bulletins from the front in a battle for survival" s are so
"'threatening precisely because [they are so] bold and ugly."
Now, with all of the controversy, the question seems to be whether or
not rap music is protected speech. Does this form of expression with its
explicit sei, violence, and profanity fall outside First Amendment protection? Or does it speak from the "gut of disenfranchised America" 10 in
such a way that entitles it to every bit of protection the First Amendment" can afford?
This Article considers some of the more violent, profane, and sexually
oriented rap music"a in light of three categories of protected expression. 8
The lyrical message of the music and the messages the artists themselves
expound in interviews will be carried through the topics of subversive ad4. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd sub
nom., Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992). Due to the album's
graphic, uncompromising references to "genitalia, human sexual excretion, oral-anal contact,
fellatio, group sex, specific sexual positions, sado-masochism, the turgid state of the male
sexual organ, masturbation, cunnilingus, [and] sexual intercourse" Judge Gonzalez, of the
district court, felt that the album is legally obscene. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp.
at 591.
5. Alan Light, Ice-T, The Rolling Stone Interview, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 20, 1992, at
30. It is important to note that "Cop Killer" will not be discussed in this Article. "Cop
Killer" was recorded and released by Ice-T's speed-metal band, Body Count. Id. Therefore,
because it is technically not a rap song, it does not fall within the parameters of this Article.
However, the song's rap mentality and the fact that a prominent rap artist was involved in
its recording demonstrate the ever-continuing and growing controversy that surrounds this
type of expression.
6. David Gates, et. al., Decoding Rap Music, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 19, 1990, at 60.
7. Janine McAdams, Credibility & Commerciality, BILLBOARD, Nov. 23, 1991, at R3.
8.

Gates, supra note 6.

9. Robert Scheer, Does censorship kill brain cells?, PLAYBOY, Oct. 1990, at 55.
10. Richard Corliss,. X rated, TIME, May 7, 1990, at 92.
11. "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech ....
"U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause incorporates the First Amendment against the States. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
12. Specifically artists such as N.W.A., Ice Cube, Ice-T, Public Enemy, and 2 Live Crew.
13. Unfortunately, the entire scope of free speech and its related topics is beyond the
scope of this Article. This in no way means the other topics are less worthy of analysis and
discussion in this context or less important than the three chosen here.

RAP MUSIC
vocacy, offensive language (as it has been derived from the "fighting
words" doctrine), and obscenity. The effort is to establish that rap music
is a protected form of expression despite its potentially shocking lyrical
content.1"
I. SUBVERSIVE ADVOCACY
A.

Legal Doctrine

The first United States Supreme Court rulings in this area were borne
out of World War I and the advocacy of insubordination and obstruction
of enlistment in the armed forces."' Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority in Schenck v. United States,1 6 originated the "clear and present
danger" test to determine what type of speech could be abridged despite
the First Amendment guarantees.1 7 In Schenck and Debs v. United
States," the Court found that defendants' efforts to influence recruits to
resist service in the war were intended to obstruct the draft and recruitment for service in the armed forces. 9 Because these efforts presented a
"clear and present danger" of disrupting the United States' war effort,
0
the Court allowed the suppression of this speech.2
1
In Abrams v. United States,2
however, Justice Holmes dissented arguing that an additional requirement in the "clear and present danger" test
14. An important point to consider while reading this Article is the artists' responsibility
for the words they speak, especially in the area of subversive advocacy. In this age of communication, a good argument can be made that those whose words literally speak to millions
should exercise a great degree of discretion and be responsible for what they say and how
they say it. From a legal standpoint, it seems that artists need not consider the ramifications
of their words. But in the wake of the Los Angeles riots, can we continue to allow artists free
reign or should we now require them to temper their words and attempt to offer solutions to
problems instead of just venting them in an arguably unproductive way? Unfortunately, the
topic is too broad for this Article and this is the only treatment it will receive; however, it is
a compelling point for consideration and worthy of further discussion.
15. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S.
466 (1920).
16. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
17. The Schenck test:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree.
Id. at 52.
18. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
19. 249 U.S. at 53; 249 U.S. at 216.
20. 249 U.S. at 52; 249 U.S. at 216.
21. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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was the immediacy of the danger. 22 According to Justice Holmes, if the
danger was not immediate then suppression of speech was unconstitutional. Justice Holmes further elaborated on this concept in his dissent to
Gitlow v. New York, 23 again stressing that only the danger of immediate
action justified the suppression of speech.2 4 The Court majority in Gitlow,
however, deferred to legislatures and allowed them to forbid advocacy of
doctrines aimed at overthrowing the government without requiring the
legislatures to wait until "'a present and imminent danger of the success
of the plan advocated"' was upon them.2 Speech could be curtailed, consistent with the First Amendment, even if it did not advocate2 specific
acts, immediate action, or even a call to specific persons to act.
Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v. California7 was ihe first
signal of the Court's shift to a probability standard for constitutional suppression of speech that would reach full fruition in Dennis v. United
States." Justice Brandeis said "[t]o justify suppression of free speech
there must be reasonable ground to ... believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
evil to be prevented is a serious one."12 ' Justice Brandeis went further to

state that a "clear and present danger" could not be found unless one
could expect serious violence to immediately follow the speech or that the
speech advocated such immediate violence.3 0
In Dennis the court convicted the defendants of conspiring to organize
a group or society of persons that advocated the overthrow or destruction
of the United States government by force or violence in violation of the
Smith Act.8' The advocacy in this case was organizing the Communist
Party of the United States of America.8 2 The Court changed the Schenck
standard to an outright balancing test. The test placed the "gravity" of
22. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). "(W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe ... unless they so imminently
threaten immediate interference with... the law that an immediate check is required to
save the country." Id.
23. 268 US. 652 (1925).
24. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting). "Every idea is an incitement. . [if
it had been

an) attempt to induce uprising against government at once and not at some indefinite time
in the future it would have presented a different question." Id.
25. Id. at 669 (quoting People v. Lloyd, 136 N.E. 505, 512 (111. 1922)).

26. Id. at 671-72.
27. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
28. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
29. 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 377. Justice Brandeis stressed the immediacy requirement by saying "[ijf
there
be time .. .to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence." Id.
31. 341 U.S. at 497.

32. Id.
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the evil on a scale with the improbability of the evil's occurrence. The
balance would determine if an invasion of free speech to prevent the evil
was justifiable under the First Amendment.,3 The Court concluded that
organizing and advocating the violent overthrow of government was a
"clear and present danger" justifying suppression of free speech-." Justice
Jackson, in his concurrence to Dennis, propounded that it is not easy,
when deciding if suppression of speech is appropriate and justifiable, to
distinguish between teaching or advocating violence with the goal of inciting violence from teaching or advocating violence with the goal of explication.3 5 This particular problem that Justice Jackson recognized has
haunted the Court in most of its decisions in the subversive advocacy
field of First Amendment jurisprudence.
The decision in Brandenburg v. OhiosO appears to have been the last
37
formulation of the applicable rule in this area of First Amendment law.
In a per curiam opinion, the Court stated that the constitutional guarantee of free speech permitted advocacy of the use of force or violation of
the law unless such advocacy is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."3 8 The
Court held that speech teaching a resort to force or violence may not be
abridged while speech preparing a group for violent action and "'steeling
it to such action'" could be justifiably suppressed. 39
The limitations on government suppression of speech advocating the
use of force or violence, expressed by the Court in Brandenburg, have
been illustrated in several cases. Two examples are Hess v. Indiana" and
NAACP, v. Claiborne Hardware Co.' 1 In Hess antiwar demonstrators
blocked traffic on a street.42 Law enforcement officers were in the process
33. Id. at 510.
34. Id. at 517.
35. Id. at 572. This proposition is of special interest in the context of this Article because
rap music of the type under discussion often.seems to do no more than explain the why of
violence rather than attempt to incite its action.
36. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
37. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), attempted to refine the Dennis rule and
give it more body to provide a clearer picture of the circumstances in which Dennis would
allow the suppression of speech. The Yates majority defined the essence of Dennis as focusing on a group of "sufficient size and cohesiveness" and indoctrinated for "future violent
action." Id. at 321. Thus, Yates effectively limited Dennis to suppression of speech advocating overthrow of the government when it is delivered in the context of an organized group
like the Communist Party. The Brandenburg decision incorporated the Yates decision's refinement of the Dennis rule.
38. 395 U.S. at 447 (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
40. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
41. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
42. 414 U.S. at 106.
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of clearing the street when defendant Hess was heard to say "fuck" and
was arrested. It was stipulated at trial that Hess had said, "We'll take the
fucking street later."' 8 The evidence at trial indicated that Hess was not
exhorting the crowd to go into the street when he made the statement,
nor was his statement directed at any particular person or group." The
Court held that this did not amount to advocacy of imminent lawless action and thus, the Court could not suppress the speech under the Brandenburg formulation."
Claiborne Hardware concerned a speech made to a large crowd. The
speech threatened violence to any individuals who patronized white
merchants. The merchants were subject to a boycott directed at securing
racial equality. 4" Emphasizing that no violence followed this statement,

the Court held that the statement was protected speech.'7 The Court declared that "[a]n advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with
spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common
cause. When such appeals do not incite lawless action, they must be regarded as protected speech."' 8
B. Rap .Music and Subversive Advocacy
Most rap music does not flatly advocate violent overthrow of governmental institutions. Rap's language could, however, lend itself to a discussion in this vein. Three songs indicative of this type of advocacy are Public Enemy's "Fight the Power," KRS-One's "Bo! Bo! Bo!," and N.W.A.'s
"Fuck Tha Police.""' "Fight the Power" raps:
Got to give us what we want
Got to give us what we need
...We got to fight the powers that be"
Undoubtedly these words advocate some kind of action against the present power structure. Presumably the specific target is government, but
the words are ambiguous and the specific target is unclear. It would seem
43. Id. at 107.
44.

Id.

45. Id. at 108. The Court maintained that the additional fact the comment was not directed at particular people prevented suppression. Id. at 108-109.
46.
them
47.
48,

458 U.S. at 899-902. The precise threat was "[i]f we catch any of you going in any of
racist stores, we're gonna break your damn neck." Id. at 902.
Id. at 928.
Id.

49. The F.B.I. sent a letter to N.W.A.'s distributor condemning the album containing
"Fuck Tha Police," STRAIGHT OUTTA COMPTON, as "encourag[ing] violence against
and disrespect for the law-enforcement officer." Adler, supra note 1.
50. PUBLIc ENEMY, Fight the Power, on FEAR OF A BLACK PLANET (Def Jam 1988).
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at first glance that this is protected because it does not advocate a resort*
to force or violence as required by Brandenburg.On the other hand, the
"got to give" and "got to fight" imply the use of force or violence and
might allow suppression. However, these lyrics do not incite lawless action; they can just as easily refer to manipulation of the present power
structure for the achievement of the goal urged by the song. 1 None of the
Supreme Court cases reviewed above support suppression of speech that
advocates action yet is ambiguous as to the lawfulness of the action advocated. All of the cases, from Schenck to Claiborne Hardware, require an
incitement to lawless action in terms more certain than those voiced in
"Fight the Power."
Slightly more difficult to dispatch are the police revenge fantasies of
KRS-One and N.W.A. KRS-One raps:
On the ground was a bottle of Snapple
I broke the bottle in his f- Adam's apple
As he fell, his partner called for back up
Well, I had the shotgun and began to act up
With than [sic] "bo bo bo bo bo, kak kak kak kak kak"
•

.

. The pnly way to deal with racism if you're black.2

N.W.A. raps:
Ice Cube will swarm
On any motherfucker in a blue uniform
...Punk police are afraid of me
A young nigger on the warpath
And when I finish

It's gonna be a bloodbath
Of cops dyin' in L.A.
...

Pullin' out a silly club so you stand

With a fake-ass badge and a gun in your hand
Take off the gun so you can see what's up
And we'll go at it punk, and I'm 'a fuck you up
...I'm a sniper with a hell of a 'scope
...Takin' out a cop or two
They can't cope with me
...Without a gun and a badge, what do you got?
A sucker in a uniform waitin' to get shot
By me, or another nigger"5
51. Public Enemy's Chuck D. provides support for this interpretation: "The system's got
its faults, and we can attack it." Steve Hochman, Taking It to the 'Burbs, LA. TiMS, Sept.
1, 1991, at 58.
52. Gates, supra note 6.
53. N.W.A., Fuck Tha Police, on STRAIGHT OUTTA COMPTON (Priority Records
1988).
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Both of these songs clearly advocate lawless action and violence. KRSOne states that to come out from under the shackle of racism, the black
man (or even race) must strike out violently at his (or its) oppressors-in
this case it is the police. N.W.A. espouses the same sort of philosophy
with "waitin' to get shot/ By me, or another nigger." N.W.A., in contrast
to KRS-One, speaks in the future and not the past tense. Although the
language of these songs seem to advocate, if not incite, lawless action,
Brandenburg's requirement of imminence of the threat, derived from
Justice Holmes' immediacy concerns in Abrams, prevents suppression.
No imminent or immediate threat exists here; at most these admittedly
indefinite future
violent songs advocate a resort to violent force at some
4
date, which is expressly protected by Brandenburg
The statements in these two songs should be accorded no greater
weight than Hess' threat of force or violence at some indefinite future
time. Following Justice Brandeis in Whitney, there can be no "clear and
present danger" with these lyrics because the evil-violence against the
police-is not so imminent that more speech can not be introduced to
avert the evil before it occurs.
Another aspect of the advocacy concerns involves what rap artists say
about their message in interviews-in other words, what they advocate
outside of their music. Black separatism has been advocated more than
once by rap artists and the obvious concern here is how to accomplish
separatism. 5 Although most rap artists do not advocate a violent, forceful, or total separation of the races, they do call for separation on at least
some level. The message is to work within the structure to change it because it can and does change.
The Brandenburgrequirements are still left unsatisfied; no advocacy of
lawless action and certainly no imminent lawless action exist. In fact,
Claiborne Hardware clearly covers the separatism ideas. Claiborne Hardware protects speech about separatism because it is merely an appeal for
unity and common action. Most importantly under Claiborne Hardware,
arguably no lawless action has resulted from these appeals for separatism.
Despite the violence and what appears to be advocacy of violence against
54. See supra note 36. See also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973).

55. Ice Cube, formerly with N.W.A., advocates unity among blacks and separatism: "It's
unite or perish ...We ...need to separate ourselves ... to create the identity that we
don't have as a people." Dennis Hunt, Outrageousas He Wants to Be, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 3,
1991, at 5. Public Enemy's Chuck D. is "looking for separate development so that we can get
to the level of the rest of society." Rap-The Power and the Controversy; Chuck D.-The
Interview, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1990, at 6. Chuck D. also says blacks must "hate your oppressor ...[your oppressor is] a collective train of thought; it's a collective state of mind. You
should hate that shit .... [I]f... [a] person claims that he's at the steering wheel of that
force of oppression, then you make your move." Bill Wyman, 20 questions: Chuck D., PLAYBOY, Nov. 1990, at 134.
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government (often in the form of the police) and demands for racial separation, the rap music considered here does not present a "clear and present danger" that would allow suppression of free speech.
II. OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE

A.

Legal Doctrine

Offensive language in the form of profanity permeates rap music. The
treatment accorded offensive language under the First Amendment was
born at the Same time as the "fighting words" doctrine, so the law concerning both is intertwined. The genesis of this line of cases is Cantwell v.
Connecticut." In Cantwell the Court held that some speech may be suppressed because it amounts to a breach of the peace due to the violence it
provokes in others.17 The Court stated that the use of epithets and personal abuse was not communication of information or opinion that the
Court would safeguard from suppression." Under this broad brushstroke
the Court included "profane, indecent, or abusive remarks" directed at
the "hearer." 9
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire" provided the basic model in this field
that guided the Court for many years. Chaplinsky addressed a government official as a "God damned racketeer" and a "damned Fascist."
The Chaplinsky case defined speech that had little social value "as a step
to truth" as worthless and unprotected." Worthless speech included the
lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, and "fighting words"-"those [words]
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace. '63 The Court decided that the words Chaplinsky
used were epithets that would likely provoke retaliation by the average
person thereby causing a breach of the peace. Thus, Chaplinsky merged
profane and other offensive utterances under the "fighting words"
rationale.
Terminiello v. City of Chicago" appears to modify Chaplinsky and allow suppression only when speech is likely to produce a "clear and present danger" of substantive evil of more consequence than "public incon56. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
57. Id. at 309.
58. Id. at 309-10.
59. Id. at 309.
60.
61.
62.

315 U.S. 568 (1942).
Id. at 569.
Id. at 572.

63. Id.
64.
65.

Id. at 574.
337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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venience, annoyance, or unrest."' s In effect, Terminiello limits the
definition of breach of the peace to a narrower range of occurrences than
might be allowed under Chaplinsky's "likely to provoke retaliation by the
67
average person" standard.
Cohen v. California" provides the next major shift in the doctrine of
this area of the law. Defendant Cohen wore a jacket into the Los Angeles
County Courthouse that clearly displayed the sentiment "Fuck the
Draft." Defendant was convicted, under California law, of disturbing the
peace by offensive conduct. 6s The Court quickly removed Cohen from the
"fighting words" context by concluding that no individual present at the
time could reasonably consider Cohen's jacket to be a "direct personal
insult" as required by Cantwell and Chaplinsky.70 The Court refined the
issue of Cohen to be one of a state attempting to remove an offensive
word from the public vocabulary. The theory, in the Court's eyes, behind
the attempted removal was that it was a proper exercise of the state's role
as "guardian[] of public morality" to seek such removal.7 1 The Court re72
fused to allow the State to practice such a blatant form of censorship.
The Court reasoned that states do not have a right to cleanse public debate so that it is inoffensive to even the most sensitive of its citizens.78
The statement "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric, ' 74 encapsulates the
approach the Court adopted in considering Cohen. In concluding its opinion, the Court recognized that specific words can themselves embody
ideas and inexpressible emotions and that suppression of certain words
can, therefore, also suppress speech protected by the First Amendment. 7,
66. Id. at 4.
67. 315 U.S. at 574.
68. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).

69.
70.
71.
72.
73..

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

74.

Id.

16.
20.
22.23.
23.

75. Id. at 26. This view has gained eloquent support:
The notion that speech is not suppressed by regulations on the manner of expression, because alternative ways of communicating the same message are available,

does not seem to hold up under the scrutiny of contemporary communication
knowledge. It is a "separate but equal" doctrine that suffers some of the same
defects as that doctrine did when applied to educational opportunities. For example, it can hardly be maintained that phrases like, "Repeal the Draft," "Resist the
Draft," or "The Draft Must Go" convey essentially the same message as "Fuck the

Draft." Clearly something is lost in the translation.
Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.
L. Rav. 153, 189 (1972).
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Following Cohen, the Court remanded three cases for reconsideration
in light of Cohen. The assumption that follows is that the Court believed
Cohen effectively allowed the language concerned in the cases. In Lewis v.
City of New Orleans7 6 defendant addressed police officers, during the
performance of their duties, as "'G[od]d[amn] M[other]F[uckers].' "7
Defendant in Rosenfeld v. New Jersey" used "'m[other] f[ucker]'" on
four occasions at a public school board meeting attended by a large number of women and children." Brown v. Oklahoma0 concerned references
defendant made during a question and answer period in front of a large
group. The statements at issue included references to police officers as
"'m[other]f[ucking] fascist pig cops'" and a reference to a particular police officer as a "'black m[other]f[ucking] pig.' ,8
In each of the three cases, the Court's remand implies that the language is protected under Cohen and may not be suppressed. The mere
offensiveness of the language used cannot justify suppression. The only
instance of potential suppression is in Lewis, but Justice Powell's concurrence proposes that police officers are "trained to exercise a higher degree
of restraint than the average citizen. ''" 2 Justice Powell effectively renders
the Chaplinsky "fighting words" test ineffective in Lewis by removing police officers from the realm of average citizens. Justice Powell's dissent in
Rosenfeld, however, raises the issue of using such offensive language in
front of an "unwilling audience" and whether that fact could have some
bearing on the suppression of free speech when in that context. 83
Cohen (and Lewis, Rosenfeld, and Brown) caused Chaplinsky to undergo redefinition. The holdings of the later cases extricated profane utterances from Chaplinsky suppression. This completely removes
Chaplinsky from the analysis of offensive profane language and relegates
the case only to the "fighting words" doctrine. Although this relegation
really makes no analytical difference here, it does help remove the offensive language discussion from the problematic holding of Chaplinsky that
profane speech may constitutionally be suppressed.
8"
One more case of interest on this topic is FCC v. PacificaFoundation.
Although the case primarily deals with the broadcasting of indecency,
some of the principles espoused are of some concern. Pacifica deals with
76. 408 U.S. 913 (1972).
77. Id. at 913 (Powell, J., concurring).
78. 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
79. Id. at 910 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

80. 408 U.S. 914 (1972).
81. Id. at 911 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
82. 408 U.S. at 913 (Powell, J., concurring).
83. 408 U.S. at 909 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell believes that the unwilling
audience changes the level of tolerance that must be accorded such language. Id.

84. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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comedian George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue. The monologue
makes liberal use of the words "shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker,
motherfucker, and tits,"85 words that appear frequently in the style of rap
music under discussion.
In Pacifica the Court held that Federal Communication Commission
("FCC") regulation of speech such as that in the Carlin monologue was
not a violation of the broadcaster's First Amendment rights.8 The Court
relied on the "uniquely pervasive presence" of broadcast media in society78 and the media's unique accessibility to children"8 to justify its ruling
that the FCC could prohibit the broadcast of such language during the
afternoon.89
Although the holding in Pacifica seems to be inconsistent with the
holding in Cohen, it is not. The Court in Pacifica did not allow the removal of the "offensive language" from common discourse; that would
contradict the holding of Cohen. Instead, the holding in Pacifica relates
more to the timing of the language's exposure during the broadcast day.
The timing restriction in Pacifica is consistent with the decision in Cohen, which is mainly concerned with governmental attempts to remove
profanity from common discourse.
Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in Pacifica recognizes that the
content and context of speech are important in freedom of expression
analysis. 0 Justice Stevens asserted that speech like that concerned in
Pacifica depends on the circumstances to define its social value and its
capacity to offend. 1 Justice Stevens even went as far as paraphrasing
Justice Harlan in Cohen by stating that "one occasion's lyric is another's
vulgarity." ' Thus, while the Cohen decision prevents outright suppression of profanity, the Pacifica decision allows its regulation dependent
upon the context of the language. The unique accessibility of broadcasting to children is a determinative factor in the Pacifica holding disallowing' broadcasts like the Carlin monologue during times children would
likely be in the audience." The question this raises naturally is what message Pacifica sends to rap artists whose recordings are easily accessible to
children?
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 751.
Id. at 748.
Id.
Id. at 749.

89. Id. at 729. The Court emphasized the narrowness of its holding, basically stating that
while the language may be acceptable to be broadcast, the time of day was inappropriate
and thus allowed for regulation by the FCC. Id. at 750.
90. Id. at 744.
91. Id. at 747. Words "commonplace in one setting are shocking in another." Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 749-50.
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Rap Music and Offensive Language

In the context of the type of rap music being discussed, Cohen's statement that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric"" is of extreme importance. Profanity is a staple of this form of rap music. Recall the sample
lyrics from "Fuck Tha Police" by N.W.A.9" and the importance of the
Cohen decision becomes all too clear. Consider these examples from
N.W.A.:
AK-47 is the tool
Don't make me act a motherfuckin' fool"
Public Enemy:
Elvis was a hero to most
But he never meant shit to me you see
Straight up racist that sucker was
Simple and plain
Motherfuck him and John Wayne17
and Ice-T:
Girls, Let's get butt naked and fuck."
In every context mentioned, the profanity does not carry the same weight
as it did in Cohen because it is not all politically oriented. However, Cohen's holding is not limited to profanity in speech that was politically
oriented, and Cohen was not interpreted that restrictively by Lewis, Rosenfeld, and Brown.
Clearly none of the quoted examples are "fighting words" as defined
under Chaplinsky because they are not directed at any specific person
and are not uttered in that person's presence. In that .sense they are more
like Cohen; the expletives are used for purposes other than personally
abusive epithets. Justice Brennan's dissent in Pacifica appropriately
states that the words George Carlin used may be everyday conversational
fare in some of the cultures of this country." Indeed, in the culture populated by rap aficionados, expletive-laced conversation is commonplace.
Otherwise this type of rap music would not enjoy the amount of success
and popularity that it does enjoy.
94. See supra note 74.
95. Supra note 53 and accompanying text.
96. N.WA., Straight Outta Compton, on STRAIGHT OUTTA COMPTON (Priority
Records 1988).
97. PusLic ENEMY, supra note 50.
98. IcE-T, Girls, L.G.B.N.A.F., on POWER (Sire 1988).
99. 438 U.S. at 776 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan cites several academic
research works as support for this proposition.
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Cohen is not limited to allowing the words for their own sake. Justice
Harlan's opinion in Cohen states:
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it
conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication,
but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often

chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot
sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive
content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive
function which . . .may often be the more important element of the
overall message sought to be communicated .... [W]e cannot ... for-

bid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. 100
Thus, Justice Harlan recognized that allowing the use of profanity in
common discourse is justifiable, if not necessary.
Rap artists often tend to see themselves as communicators or reporters
from the street. Ice-T encapsulates this view by saying that black culture
uses music as "a forum for communication and education." 10 1 Chuck D. of
Public Enemy says music is "communication . . . [A]ll us rappers
are-communicators." 1°2 Ice Cube explains that "[r]ap. . .gives you in108
formation. It tells you about what you're up against in society."
If rap is such a powerful medium to communicate and educate, why is
it so laced with profanity? Rap artists say that to reach the audience they
want to reach, they must speak the language the audience speaks or else
the artists will be ignored. "I can't code or dilute my message, because I'd
sound like a hinky-dink to my brothers," says Ice-T.10 ' In other words,
drop the profanity and the artist loses his credibility with his audience.
Ice Cube asserts, "I speak in a language we talk in the streets"10 and
"[tlhe homeboys know exactly what we're saying."'"
The basic lesson is that rappers are trying to communicate something
to an audience that must be addressed in its own language. Whether it is
pride in the black race ("Motherfuck him and John Wayne"), pure rage
("Don't make me act a motherfuckin' fool"), or a host of other complex
emotions, the vernacular of the street is essential to get the message
across. It is this type of speech that Cohen and its progeny protect. Cohen protects speech that embodies a message to its primary audience
100. 403 U.S. at 26.
101. Greg Kot, Rap's Bad Rap, CHIcAGo TRIBUNE, Apr. 15, 1990, at 4.
102. Robert Hilburn, Getting a Bad Rap, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1990, at 8.
103. Robert Hilburn, Notorious Ice Cube: Still the 'Most Wanted,' LA TIMES, May 27,
1990, at 65.
104. Kot, supra note 101.
105. Hunt, supra note 55.
106. Hilburn, supra note 102.
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even though the form of that message offends other members of society.
The vitality of the message is expressed in its simple configuration using
in the street culture can mean far more than just a
four-letter words that
"scurrilous epithet. ' 107
III. OBSCENITY
A. Legal Doctrine
Roth v. United States'06 established concretely that obscenity enjoys
no constitutional protection.' The Roth test for obscenity asks whether
the average person applying contemporary community standards would
find that a work's dominant theme appealed to the prurient interest; if it
does then the work is considered to be obscene.110
The Roth test greatly disturbed Justice Douglas who vehemently attacked the Court's position in his dissent. Justice Douglas was disturbed
by the Court's punishment of thoughts and utterances when they were
He desperately tried to incorporate the
totally unrelated to action.'
Dennis stance that to punish speech there must be a relation between the
speech being suppressed and some action."' He even went so far as asserting that "the arousing of sexual thoughts and desires happens every
day in normal life in dozens of ways,"' 13 and therefore, no suppression
should attach to mere arousal. Justice Douglas, however, remained in the
minority. His views, contrasted with the Court in Roth, reflect the divisiveness on the issue of sexually oriented speech-a divisiveness that can
be traced through all of the Court's cases concerning obscenity.
Jacobellis v. Ohio" 4 is most famous for Justice Stewart's concurrence
in which he says that he has difficulty defining obscenity but "I know it
when I see it."' This catch phrase reflects the difficulty the Court has
had developing a standard in this area of law, and it also lends itself,
unfortunately, to use by censors who merely wish to suppress speech they
find offensive. Beyond Justice Stewart, however, Jacobellis also establishes that the work being considered must be utterly without redeeming
social value in order to be obscene."' Thus, a work with any social value
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112,
113.
114.
115.
116.

403 U.S. at 22.
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
Id. at 485.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
378 U.S. 184 (1964).
Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 191.
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at all is not obscene under Jacobellis.The Court also defined the community in the community standards requirement as a national community."'
The obscenity standard was crystallized in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts,'1 only to be
altered seven years later by the decision in Miller v. California.119 The
Court in Memoirs required three elements to coalesce before establishing
a finding of obscenity."" The elements required for finding obscenity
were: the dominant theme of the work as a whole had to appeal to the
prurient interest; the work had to be patently offensive in its description
of sexual matters in a manner offending contemporary community standards; and the work had to be utterly without social value121 Justice
Douglas' concurrence in Memoirs recognizes the fundamental flaw in all
of obscenity jurisprudence. Justice Douglas' observation is both the most
easily ignored and the most damning indictment of the arbitrariness of
the decisions in this field: "We are judges ... [; w]e are not competent to
render an independent judgment as to the worth of... any.., book,
except in our capacity as private citizens. 122 Justice Douglas truly recognized how absurd it is for the Court to sit in judgment of artistic works
when the only true test of obscenity is a personal, value-laden morality.
Miller established the presently controlling test for obscenity. It rejected the Roth-Memoirs test 23 and redefined community standards 12to4
the local level, thereby rejecting Jacobellis' national standard ruling.
The Miller obscenity standard requires proof of three factors. The first
factor is that the average person applying contemporary community standards would find the work as a whole appeals to the prurient interest.
The second factor requires that the work depict or describe sexual conduct, specifically defined by state statutes, in a patently offensive manner.
Finally, the work as a whole must lack "serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.". 25
B. 2 Live Crew and Obscenity
The obscenity law applied to the type of rap music under consideration
is best discussed in the context of the 2 Live Crew case-Skyywalker
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 195.
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
383 U.S. at 418.
Id.

122. Id. at 427 (Douglas, J., concurring). Judge Gonzalez in Skyywalker Records epitomizes this argument. Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 590.
123. 413 U.S. at 23.

124. Id. at 30.
125. Id. at 24.
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Records. The two portions of the Miller test that will be focused on are
the community standard requirement and the serious literary value
requirement.
The rap group 2 Live Crew, plaintiffs in Skyywalker Records, released
the album As Nasty As They Wanna Be in 1989. Complaints by some
south Florida residents led to an investigation of the recording by the
Broward County Sheriff's office."" A deputy sheriff purchased a copy of
the recording at a retail music store and had six of the eighteen songs
transcribed. The deputy prepared an affidavit seeking a finding of probable cause that the recording was legally obscene. The deputy submitted
the affidavit, the transcription,1 7and the copy of the recording to the
Broward County Circuit Court. 2
An order was issued that established probable cause to believe the recording was obscene. Deputy sheriffs, displaying their badges in plain'
view, visited approximately twenty stores, furnished the managers with'
copies of the order, and told the managers that they should refrain from
selling the recording. Within days, all retail stores in Broward County
stopped selling the recording.128
In determining the community standard to be applied in Skyywalker
Records, Judge Gonzalez stated that although the community standard
applied was not *his personal opinion, it was reflective of his "personal
knowledge of community standards."' 12 The Eleventh Circuit conceded,
without deciding, that the judge's familiarity with the contemporary community standards was sufficient to satisfy the Miller test.130
This seems highly suspect. Even though the small segment targeted by
2 Live Crew cannot serve as the community standard for the entire community, it is a vitally important segment of the community when the obscenity of rap music is under consideration. It is not a stretch of the imagination to believe that Judge Gonzalez probably had little, if any,
knowledge of the contemporary community standard in the community
that 2 Live Crew (or other rap artists) was striving to reach. Even the
Eleventh Circuit stated that if the material in question was not directed
to a "'bizarre, deviant group' not within the experience. of the average
person, the best evidence is the material."1 31
Although the rap audience would not likely fit into a legal definition of
bizarre or deviant, it cannot truly be said to be in the experience of the
126.
127.
128.
opinion
129.
130.
131.

Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 582.
Id. at 583.
Id. This paper will not discuss the second major portion of the Skyywalker Records
dealing with the prior restraint issue. Id. at 600.
Id. at 590.
Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d at 138.
Id. at 137.
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average person. The implication is that the material itself is not the best
evidence and some other evidence of the community standard is required.
Judge Gonzalez should have accepted testimony from other sources that
would instruct him on the community standards of the culture that produces and is targeted by rap artists like 2 Live Crew. A true community
standard cannot be derived for obscenity purposes until that culture is
considered. A community consists of too many standards and cultures for
one judge to be conversant enough in them all to derive a community
standard based solely on personal knowledge.
2 Live Crew produces sexist and sexually explicit rap music, the precise
issues that concerned Judge Gonzalez. 18 2 Despite the sexism and explicit
sex, rap music of the type that 2 Live Crew produces has been called
"unerringly precise" in its reflection of its community. 183 Judge Gonzalez
seemed to ignore even the clearest indication of community standards
available to him-the fact that approximately 1.7 million copies of the
album As Nasty As They Wanna Be had been sold by the time of the
1 It is true that album sales.figures span the nation and are not
trial.'4
local, and community-specific, and Miller instructs that the local community must provide the community standard. Despite that fact, the evident
popularity of the recording must at least indicate that "a lot of the community is laughing and singing along,"' 30 and provide an indicator warranting consideration when setting the community standard. Basing the
determination of the applicable community standard on personal knowledge when that standard will be used to suppress speech is both errant
and irresponsible.
In an attempt to show that their rap songs had serious artistic value, 2
Live Crew made two points: it discussed raps' roots in the black oral tradition and explained how those roots were evident in 2 Live Crew's music. " "' "Doing the dozens" (escalating satirical insults) and "boasting"
(overstating virtues like sexual prowess) were two such traditions focused
on at trial that Judge Gonzalez glibly dismissed as "part of the universal
human condition."' 3 7 Even if Judge Gonzalez was right, these traditions
are most (if not exclusively) prevalent in modern rap music. The prevalence of these oral traditions would suggest that they are somehow vital
to the meaning and importance of rap music. Denying the consideration
of these traditions on the basis of their supposed universality could very
well have destroyed the key to understanding the artistic value of, the
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

739 F. Supp. at 591.
Harry Allen, Hip-Hop Madness, EssENce, Apr. 1989, at 78.
Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 582.
Corliss, supra note 10.
Skyywalker Records, Inc., 739 F. Supp. at 594.
Id.
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music. It would be and is foolish to deny that songs with titles like "Me
So Horny" and "Dick Almighty" do not employ the "exaggerated style
[of] inner-city culture."1 s
The Eleventh Circuit reversed Judge Gonzalez on the artistic merit
prong of the Miller test.18 ' The court stated that the question of whether
a work possesses serious value is not to be decided by contemporary community standards.140 The court rejected "the argument that simply by listening to this musical work, the judge could determine that it had no
serious artistic value.'1
A culture was just as surely on trial in Skyywalker Records as was 2
Live Crew; a culture that Gonzalez virtually ignored by not entertaining
the notion that perhaps that culture viewed sexual conduct from a different perspective. "[J]udges must be willing to accept as authoritative the
Otherwise, it is unclear what criteria
views of ... rap music critics ....
judges [will) use in determining artistic
value and the danger of rulings
1 42
based on personal bias is increased. '
The problem with the Miller test as applied to rap music of this genre
is that this rap music is born of a culture that is a segment of the community standard. Never before has this segment clashed with the community
as a whole so clearly as it does now. Judges must accept both the existence of this segment and the fact that they probably know nothing about
the roots and genesis of its music. A judge cannot make a personal determination of what the community standard is without first considering the
community that is home to this musical expression. A judge cannot'determine serious literary or artistic merit without considering what this expression means to the people who say it and the culture that has fostered
its growth. Pacifica teaches that speech means nothing without its context. Judge Gonzalez ignored this lesson in Skyywalker Records and thus,
reached an erroneous determination that 2 Live Crew's recording As
Nasty As They Wanna Be is legally obscene. The Eleventh Circuit, however, did not ignore the lesson, at least in part.
IV. CONCLUSION
The rap music considered in this Article is an urgent message that deserves to be heard. Despite the abundant profanity, the violence, and the
explicit sex, this rap music is constitutionally protected speech.
138. Hilburn, supra note 102.
139. Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d at 139.
140. Id. at 138 (citing Pope v. illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987)).
141. Id. at 139.
142. Anne L. Clark, "As Nasty As They Wanna Be". PopularMusic on Trial, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1481, 1520 (Dec. 1990) (footnotes omitted).
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Under the Supreme Court's subversive advocacy decisions, rap music
cannot be suppressed because it either does not advocate lawless action or
because it does not pose any threat of imminent lawless action. There is
no "clear and present danger," as defined in the Court's decisions.
This rap music cannot be suppressed because of its offensive language.
It contains no "fighting words" because it does not address a specific person directly in the face of that person. Government cannot purge profanity from the vocabulary of the citizenry simply because it is offensive.
Even profane words can have value because they can express some ideas
with more clarity and force than other less "offensive" words.
Finally, this rap music is not obscene. Community standards must include the standards of the culture that gave birth to this type of expression. The serious literary or artistic merit of this rap music must be determined in the light of what it says, the culture that gave it life, and the
culture to which it speaks.
JON CHRISTOPHER WOLFE

